The “Collective punishment”of business group affiliations with impaired reputation:Evidence from Costs of Bank Loans

潘红波，中央财经大学会计学院博士后研究人员，武汉大学经济与管理学院教授，管理学博士；周颖，武汉大学经济与管理学院博士研究生。【中文摘要】在中国转型经济条件下，尽管金融市场、法制等正式制度不够健全,但我国经济却取得了举世瞩目的高速增长,这ー现象似乎同法制与经济发展理论相悖。针对这一“中国之谜”越来越多的学者开始关注非正式制度的重要作用。以银行贷款成本为例,可实证检验集团成员公司声誉受损给其他“无辜”成员公司带来的“连坐”效应。研究发现:集团成员公司声誉受损，会使得其他“无辜”成员公司银行贷款成本显著上升;这种效应在民营企业以及金融市场、法制水平等正式制度较好的区域中更强。在中国转型经济条件下，集团声誉作为ー种非正式制度对成员公司的外部融资具有重要的影响，并且与金融市场、法制水平等正式制度存在互补关系。 【Abstract】TaKing costs of bank loans as an example，the paper examines the “collective punishment” caused by affiliated firms whose reputation is impaired. The result indicates that when the reputation of a member is impaired，the costs of bank loans of other “innocent” members in the business group will be raised sigilicantly. Moreover，this effect is more pronounced in private companies and in institutions where the financial market and legal protection is better. This indicates that in the transition economy of China，the reputation of business group，as an informal institution，has a significant impact on the external financing of affiliated firms，and is complementary to formal institutions.国家自然科学基金项目“官员交流对地方国企高管治理的影响及其经济后果研究”（71572133